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PROPERTY LAW 
W. Wade Berryhill* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As legal years go, action on the 1996 legislative and judicial 
fronts was relatively quiet in the area of property law. The 
legislative activity which spawned most of the interest was bills 
addressing the definitional limits of the unauthorized practice 
of law in real estate closings. These bills were not enacted and 
have been carried over for the next legislative session. 
Several judicial decisions, although none could be described 
as landmark determinations, are of interest and clarify points 
of law. These cases, as well as selected items of legislation 
which are believed to be of the most practical interest to the 
practitioner, are what follow. 
II. LEGISLATION 
A. Recordings and Closings 
Virginia Code sections 17-83.1:1 to -83.1:4 were added to 
provide for the electronic filing of documents in those counties 
where a circuit court clerk has established a system for receiv-
ing electronically transmitted information.1 Interestingly, the 
statute provides that its provisions expire on July 1, 1998.2 
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. B.S., 
1967, Arkansas State University; J.D., 1972, University of Arkansas; LL.M., 1976, 
Columbia University. The author wishes to thank Duane Deskovich (J.D., 1996, T.C. 
Williams School of Law, University of Richmond) and Stephen M. Faraci (Candidate, 
J.D., 1998, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond) for their generous 
assistance on this article. 
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-83.1 to -83.1:4 (Repl. Vol. 1996). 
2. Id. 
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Virginia Code sections 6.1-2.13 and 6.1-2.13:1 were am.ended 
to provide for the disbursement of funds prior to recordation of 
documents if such funds were: (a) overpayments; (b) recordation 
fees; or (c) funds which the provider, by separate instrument, 
has directed disbursement prior to recordation. 3 
Further, Virginia Code section 38.2-4614 was am.ended to 
prohibit the receipt of or payment of kickbacks or rebates by 
real estate agents, attorneys, settlement agents or lenders inci-
dent to real estate settlement.4 Title insurance companies are 
similarly prohibited from paying or receiving such kickbacks, 
rebates or commissions.5 
The procedure for the release of deeds of trust and liens has 
been simplified by amendment to section 55-66.3. One need 
only to file an affidavit, which states that the debt has been 
paid, together with the certificate of satisfaction. 6 It is no lon-
ger necessary to produce the canceled note before the circuit 
court clerk to provide evidence of a lost note. 
Notice to potential purchasers of a lien against the property 
for a local assessment, fee, rent or charge (other than real es-
tate taxes) may now be provided by recording in either the 
judgment lien book in the circuit court clerk's office, or in the 
records maintained by the local treasurer for real estate tax 
liens pursuant to section 58.1-3930.7 
Broker's liens for any unpaid rents are now limited to the 
lesser of either the rent to be paid during the term of the lease 
or the amount of rent to be paid during the first twenty years 
of the lease. 8 
Virginia Code section 17-59 was am.ended to provide that the 
clerk of the circuit court may refuse to record any document 
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-2.13, -2.13:1 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4614 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
5. Id.; see also w. WADE BERRYIIlLL, VmGINIA REAL ESTATE CLOSINGS WITH 
FORMS § 1-3 (2d ed. Supp. 1996), (Supp. 1996). 
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-66.3 (Cum. Supp. 1996). The suggested form in the stat-
ute for the certificate of satisfaction was also modified. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
66.4:1 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-37.3:13 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-527 (Cum. Supp. 1996). The former limit could not ex-
ceed the lesser of the amount paid during the term of the lease or the amount paid 
during the first five years under the lease. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-527 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
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unless the first page of the instrument bears the name of the 
person or entity who drafted the instrument. 9 Documents pre-
pared outside of the Commonwealth may be recorded without 
the notation.10 
B. Conveyances and Foreclosures 
Two bills enacted by the general assembly changed the man-
ner and time for accounting after a sale, and one item of legis-
lation expanded the validity of conveyances made by foreign 
executors. 
Virginia Code section 26-15 was amended to increase from 
four months to six months the time in which a trustee under a 
recorded deed of trust must file an account of sale to the com-
missioner of accounts.11 
Section 64.1-184 was amended to permit distribution of sale 
proceeds within a one-year period after the decedent's death 
upon the posting of a bond with surety to secure any potential 
claims against the decedent's property. 12 
Sections 64.1-149 and 64.1-150 were amended to validate 
conveyances of real estate made in the Commonwealth prior to 
and after June 30, 1986 by foreign executors.13 The sections 
previously affected only conveyances made prior to or after 
June 30, 1960.14 
An amendment to section 17-79.3 added Fauquier, Montgom-
ery and Spotsylvania to the list of counties where the clerk of 
the circuit court may require that deeds and other real estate 
documents bear the tax map references in the left margin of 
the first page of the instrument. 15 · 
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-59 (Repl. Vol. 1996). 
10. Id. 
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-15 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-184 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
13. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-149, -150 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
14. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-149, -150 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-79.3 (Repl. Vol. 1996). 
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C. Disclosure and Disclaimer Forms 
The disclosure and disclaimer forms required to be furnished 
to residential real estate purchasers must now contain a notice 
to purchasers that the vendor makes no representations as to 
any parcels adjacent to the subject parcel.16 The notice must 
also advise purchasers to exercise whatever due diligence that 
the purchaser deems necessary with respect to adjacent par-
cels.17 
D. Fixtures 
Now included in the definition of items deemed permanently 
annexed to the freehold are underground or field-constructed 
above-ground storage tanks and connected dispensing equip-
ment.18 
E. Condominiums 
Two bills amended the requirements for public offering state-
ments and expressly authorized the power of condominium unit 
owners' associations to limit the number of persons who may 
occupy. a condominium unit.19 
Public offering statements must now contain a statement of 
any limitation on the number of persons who may occupy a 
unit and a statement listing the facilities or amenities which 
are defined as common elements. 20 Such statements must be 
found in the condominium instruments which are available for 
a purchaser's use.21 Further, such statements must include 
whether any charges or fees are required for use of facilities. 22 
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-519 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
17. Id. 
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-2 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
19. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.80:3 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.90(aX10), (11) (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
21. Id. 
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.90(aX10) (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
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F. Building Code 
The period of time for discovery of violations under the Uni-
form Statewide Building Code has been increased from one year 
to two years from the date of initial occupancy or use after 
construction of the building or structure, or the issuance of a 
certificate of use and occupancy for the building or structure, 
whichever is later.23 However, the time to commence prosecu-
tions under section 36-106 relating to the maintenance of exist-
ing buildings or structures as contained in the Uniform State-
wide Building Code has been reduced from two years to one 
year after the discovery of the offense.24 
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Zoning 
The Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed its longstanding 
rule of the presumptive validity given to legislative action of a 
city when dealing with zoning decisions in City Council of Sa-
lem v. Wendy's of Western Virginia, Inc.25 In Wendy's of West-
ern Virginia, the supreme court considered whether the reason-
ableness of the existing zoning on the subject property was 
fairly debatable. The supreme court reversed the trial court, 
holding that the City of Salem's legislative action in denying 
the rezoning petition was reasonable, and not arbitrary and 
capricious. 26 
In Donovan v. Board of Zoning Appeals,27 the supreme court 
rejected a decision by the Board of Zoning Appeals of 
Rockingham County which had determined that Donovan's 
failure to screen his automobile graveyard invalidated the non-
conforming use of his property. The county code provision at 
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Cum. Supp. 1996); see VA. CODE ANN. 36-106 (Repl. 
Vol. 1996). 
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Cum. Supp. 1996); see VA. CODE ANN. 36-106 (Repl. 
Vol. 1996). 
25. 252 Va. 12, 471 S.E.2d 469 (1996). 
26. Id. at 17-18, 471 S.E.2d at 472-73. 
27. 251 Va. 271, 467 S.E.2d 808 (1996). 
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issue did not specifically provide for the loss of a non-conform-
ing use for the failure to screen an automobile graveyard. The 
supreme court refused to extend the county code provision by 
implication, finding that "a provision requiring that a particular 
nonconforming use be screened from public view is not the 
same as a provision invalidating the nonconforming use itself 
for failure to comply with the screening requirement."28 
Virginia Code sections 15.1-491.1 to -491.2 empowers a locali-
ty to enact a zoning ordinance that "may include and provide 
for the voluntary proffering ... by [a zoning applicant] of rea-
sonable conditions. "29 At issue in Board of Supervisors v. 
Reed's Landing Corp. 30 was whether the Board of Supervisors' 
demand of a cash proffer violated the code section by imposing 
an unlawful restriction on the developer. The supreme court af-
firmed the trial court's holding that the Board imposed an un-
lawful condition on the developer, because the clear, unambigu-
ous language of the code section states that proffers of condi-
tions must be made voluntarily.31 
B. Dedication 
The issue in McNew v. McCoy32 was whether an access road 
to the plaintiff's property was dedicated as a public road. The 
supreme court held that where no dedication is declared, accep-
tance of the land by the public could be formal and express, as 
by the enactment of a resolution by the appropriate governing 
body, or by implication arising from either an exercise of do-
minion by the governing authority or from long continued pub-
lic use of requisite character.33 In McNew, there was neither a 
formal enactment of a resolution by the governing body nor an 
implied dedication arising from exercise of dominion over the 
road by the governing body. The supreme court, in rejecting the 
plaintiff's implied dedication argument, noted that the "doctrine 
28. Id. at 275, 467 S.E.2d at 811. 
29. Board of Supervisors v. Reed's Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397, 398, 463 S.E.2d 
668, 668 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-491.2, -491.2:1 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. 
Supp. 1996). 
30. 250 Va. 397, 463 S.E.2d 668 (1995). 
31. Id. at 400, 463 S.E.2d at 670. 
32. 251 Va. 297, 467 S.E.2d 477 (1996). 
33. Id. at 299-300, 467 S.E.2d at 478. 
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of implied acceptance only applies in urban areas. '[A] formal 
acceptance or express assertion of dominion over the road by 
public authority is required before dedication of a rural road is 
complete.'"34 
C. Premises Liability 
At issue in Burns v. Johnson35 was whether a gasoline sta-
tion, as an owner of a parcel of land, owed a duty to protect 
the plaintiff from a third party's criminal act. In holding that 
the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendant owed her 
a duty, the supreme court reaffirmed the well-settled rule that 
"the owner or occupier of land ordinarily is under no duty to 
protect an invitee from a third person's criminal act committed 
while the invitee is upon the premises."36 The supreme court 
determined that the facts did not show "notice of a specific 
danger just prior to the assault," so as to fit it within the limit-
ed exception to the general rule established in Wright v. 
Webb.37 
D. Easements 
1. Express Easements 
In Collins v. Fuller,38 the supreme court reversed the trial 
court's decree that limited the Collins' use of a right of way to 
the laying of a pipeline across the Fuller's land in order to 
access a spring. 39 The supreme court cited Cushman Corp. v. 
Barnes4-0 for the proposition that an express easement that 
makes no limitations, at the time of the grant, as to the meth-
od to be employed may be used for any purpose to which the 
dominant estate may be devoted.41 
34. Id. at 300, 467 S.E.2d at 479 (quoting E.S. Chappell & Son, Inc. v. Brooks, 
248 Va. 571, 574, 450 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1994)). 
35. 250 Va. 41, 458 S.E.2d 448 (1995). 
36. Id. at 44, 467 S.E.2d at 450 (quoting Gupton v. Quicke, 247 Va. 362, 363, 
442 S.E.2d 658, 658 (1994)). 
37. Id. (quoting Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 533, 362 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1987)). 
38. 251 Va. 70, 466 S.E.2d 98 (1996). 
39. Id. at 72, 466 S.E.2d at 99. 
40. 204 Va. 245, 129 S.E.2d 633 (1963). 
41. 251 Va. at 72, 466 S.E.2d at 99 (citing Cushman, 240 Va. at 253, 129 S.E.2d 
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2. Prescriptive Easement 
To establish an easement by prescription, a party must show 
that his use of a right of way has been adverse, under a claim 
of right, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, with the knowl-
edge and acquiesce of the owners of the land, and that such 
use has continued for at least twenty years.42 The key issue in 
Chaney v. Haynes43 was whether use could be shown to be ad-
verse by a claimant's mistaken belief of a recorded right. The 
claimants in Chaney were holders of an express easement 
across a lot adjacent to Chaney's land. Mistakenly, they had 
used the land now owned by Chaney to access a public road 
and the York River. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied the 
claim, holding that use of the right of way under a mistaken 
belief cannot be adverse. 44 The claimants therefore failed to 
establish an easement by prescription. 
3. Express Easements 
In Buxton v. Murch45 the supreme court held: (1) an express 
easement could be and was created by a 1939 court decree 
ordering the sale of lots in a subdivision owned by an incompe-
tent;46 (2) the location of the easement could be changed by 
the consent and acquiescence of the lot owners;47 and (3) al-
though the 1939 decree stated that the easement was for own-
ers of lots along three streets in the subdivision for access to 
the river, the easement was ruled to be for the benefit of all of 
the owners of lots along these streets without regard to wheth-
er the lots were waterfront or non-waterfront lots.48 
In Davis v. Henning, 49 the supreme court considered the is-
sue of the supposed revival of an extinguished express ease-
at 639-40). 
42. Ward v. Harper, 234 Va. 68, 70, 360 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1987). 
43. 250 Va. 155, 458 S.E.2d 451 (1995). 
44. Id. at 159, 458 S.E.2d at 453. 
45. 249 Va. 502, 457 S.E.2d 81 (1995). 
46. Id. at 507, 457 S.E.2d at 84. 
47. Id. at 508, 457 S.E.2d at 84. 
48. Id. at 510, 457 S.E.2d at 85. 
49. 250 Va. 271, 462 S.E.2d 106 (1995). 
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ment. In Davis, a tract of land that had been previously divided 
into two parcels was joined and then divided again into the 
same two previously separate parcels by deed containing ·the 
language: "subject to [an] easement [in a prior] deed."50 The 
supreme court held that the language in the deed did not 
create an express easement by those words, but instead re-
ferred to a former easement which had been extinguished by 
the merger of the tract when the two parcels were joined as 
one.51 The division did not revive the earlier, now extin-
guished, easement. 52 
The supreme court further held that an easement by necessi-
ty, for a right of way, was created at the time of the division 
since the interior parcel would have been landlocked. 53 The 
fact that the claimant of the easement was a purchaser of the 
interior parcels under an installment sales contract and not yet 
the title holder, did not prevent the claimant from claiming an 
easement by necessity.54 
E. Fraudulent Conveyances 
Twice in the past year, the Supreme Court of Virginia was 
asked to determine the validity of a conveyance of real property 
by deed when creditors sought to have the transfer declared 
void. An existing creditor may seek to void a transfer of proper-
ty by the debtor under either of two theories: (1) transfers 
made for the purpose of defrauding creditors; and (2) transfers 
made without receipt of valuable consideration where the debtor 
is insolvent or becomes insolvent as a result of the transfer. 
Under the second theory, fraud or malicious intent need not be 
proved.55 In the first case, Hudson v. Hudson, 56 relief sought 
under Virginia Code section 55-81 was denied because the 
plaintiff did not establish that the decedent was rendered insol-
vent at the time of the transfer.57 
50. Id. at 274, 462 S.E.2d at 107. 
51. Id. at 275, 462 S.E.2d at 108. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 276, 462 S.E.2d at 108-09. 
54. See Id. at 273, 276, 462 S.E.2d at 107, 109. 
55. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-80 to -82 {Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996). 
56. 249 Va. 335, 455 S.E.2d 14 (1995). 
57. Id. at 341, 455 S.E.2d at 17-18. 
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In the second case, Balzer & Associates v. Lakes on 360, 
Inc., 58 the supreme court reversed the trial court, distinguish-
ing the two theories by saying that although proof of fraud is 
necessary under Virginia Code section 55-80, under section 55-
81 fraud is not a required element of proof.59 The case was 
then remanded to determine whether the transfer rendered the 
debtor insolvent. 
F. Eminent Domain 
Generally, when a portion of a tract of land is taken by emi-
nent domain, the owner is entitled to recover damages to the 
remainder of that land, but is not entitled to damages to sepa-
rate, independent tracts. An exception to this general rule is 
the unity of lands doctrine, which requires that three factors be 
shown: (1) unity of use, (2) physical unity, and (3) unity of 
ownership. 60 In Bogese, Inc. v. State Highway & Transporta-
tion Commissioner,61 a case of first impression, the supreme 
court rejected the authority in jurisdictions which hold that 
"two parcels, each owned by a different entity, may be consid-
ered as a single parcel to establish unity of ownership when the 
entities are integrated by family ownership, business purpose, 
and actual practice."62 Instead, the supreme court held that 
the transfer of a portion of the property, after notice of intent 
to condemn by the Virginia Department of Transportation, 63 
did not satisfy the unity of ownership factor so as to fall within 
the exception. 64 In Bogese, the transfer was from a corporation 
to a partnership, where the partners were also the sole stock-
holders of the corporation. 
58. 250 Va. 527, 463 S.E.2d 453 (1995). 
59. Id. at 531, 463 S.E.2d at 455; see also Consolidated Tramway Co. v. 
Germania Bank, 121 Va. 331, 335-36, 93 S.E. 572, 573 (1917) (distinguishing 
fraudulent and voidable deeds in relation to prior and subsequent creditors); Witz, 
Beidler & Co. v. Osburn, 83 Va. 227, 299, 2 S.E. 33, 34-35 (1887) (distinguishing 
fraudulent and voidable voluntary transfers). 
60. See Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Webb, 196 Va. 555, 566, 84 S.E.2d 735, 
741-42 (1954). 
61. 250 Va. 226, 462 S.E.2d 345 (1995). 
62. Id. at 229, 462 S.E.2d at 347. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 231, 462 S.E.2d at 348. 
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In Wammco, Inc. v. Commonwealth Transportation Commis-
sioner,65 the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision 
of the trial court to exclude proffered evidence of adjustment 
costs necessary to permit the development of remaining proper-
ty, in its changed condition, as a result of the taking. 66 The 
majority of the supreme court agreed with the trial court that 
the off-site improvements and acquisition of adjacent lands 
necessary to develop the land were too speculative. 67 The three 
justice dissent reflected the view that the proffered evidence 
exhibited conditions reflecting the impact of the taking on the 
remaining property and conditions necessary to adapt the prop-
erty to its highest and best use. 68 
G. Deeds 
1. Covenants of Title 
Pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-83, when partition 
cannot be conveniently accomplished, a grantee is permitted to 
take the entire property by allotment and pay the other parties 
and owners such sums of money as they may be entitled to 
based upon their respective interests.69 The Supreme Court of 
Virginia applied this statute to the facts in Richmond v. 
Hall. 10 In this case, the grantee had in reality only purchased 
a one-tenth interest and four life estates instead of the fee 
simple as he believed. The grantee sued the grantor for breach 
of warranties in the general warranty deed. The supreme court 
awarded offsets of the value of the remaindermen's interests, 
for which the grantee had to pay, against a purchase money 
deed of trust given to the grantor/vendor by the grant-
ee/purchaser. 71 
65. 251 Va. 132, 465 S.E.2d 584 (1996). 
66. Id. at 136, 137, 465 S.E.2d at 586. 
67. Id. at 136, 138, 465 S.E.2d at 586, 587. 
68. Id. at 140, 465 S.E.2d at 588. 
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-83 (Cum. Supp. 1996). 
70. 251 Va. 151, 466 S.E.2d 103 (1996). 
71. Id. at 161, 466 S.E.2d at 108. 
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2. Recision 
In Virginia Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Hamilton, 72 the su-
preme court refused to rescind a utility easement that was 
alleged to have been obtained through fraud, misrepresentation 
and mistake.73 The Virginia Natural Gas Co., Inc. ("VNG") 
sought an easement from the trustees of the land in question. 
A survey was conducted and the line of the proposed easement 
was delineated. At a public meeting, Hamilton attempted to 
determine which portions of the trust land would be affected by 
the easement and the value of the land affected. During negoti-
ations, VNG employees represented that the easement would lie 
in the flood plain and as a result, $2,450 was paid for the ease-
ment. Shortly thereafter, a surveyor's error was discovered and 
VNG sought reformation of the deed. The trustees sought reci-
sion of the deed based upon mutual mistake of fact, fraud and 
misrepresentation. The supreme court overturned the trial 
court's grant of partial recision for mutual mistake of fact be-
cause it was impermissibly beyond the scope of the 
pleadings.74 In addition, the supreme court held that the trust-
ees failed to carry their burden for fraud and misrepresentation 
as there was no evidence that VNG knowingly and intentionally 
misrepresented the location of the easement. 75 Although the 
value of the easement and the consideration paid were grossly 
disproportionate, the supreme court gave no remedy because 
the trustees could have, through the exercise of reasonable care, 
protected themselves. 76 
3. Construction 
In Vicars v. First Virginia Bank-Mountain Empire, 77 a deed 
described in detail seven tracts, by reference to deed book and 
acreage.78 The deed further stated that "the intention of this 
72. 249 Va. 449, 457 S.E.2d 17 (1995). 
73. Id. at 457, 457 S.E.2d at 22. 
74. Id. at 454, 457 S.E.2d at 20. 
75. Id. at 455, 457 S.E.2d at 21. 
76. Id. at 456, 457 S.E.2d at 21-22. 
77. 250 Va. 103, 458 S.E.2d 293 (1995). 
78. Id. at 106, 458 S.E.2d at 295. 
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deed is to convey all the rights, title and interest acquire[d] by 
[the grantor] from the wife and heirs of Milburn Gilliam's es-
tate."79 The supreme court held that this language did not· in-
clude other tracts, also acquired from the heirs of Gilliam, 
which were not described in the deed. 80 The supreme court 
further held that the plaintiffs were prevented from claiming 
trespass because the plaintiffs attorney had sent a letter to the 
defendants stating, in part, "my clients do not wish to impede 
the mining on the tract while these title questions are being re-
viewed," notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs prevailed 
on the issue of title.81 
H. Inverse Condemnation 
In Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. v. 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority,82 the plaintiff, R, 
F & P, asserted that its property, which fell into the "clear 
zone" at the end of a runway for Washington National Airport, 
had been taken due to the overflight of the property by aircraft, 
coupled with height restrictions on the property and the prohi-
bition of developments in the clear zone. The supreme court, 
quoting United States v. Causby,83 rejected' the inverse con-
demnation claim by reaffirming the long-standing rule that 
overflights constitute a taking only when those overflights are 
"so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate inter-
ference with the enjoyment and use of land."84 Furthermore, 
the supreme court found that the plaintiff abandoned its plans 
for an office building development in the clear zone due to 
market conditions and physical problems, rather than interfer-
ence by the Airports Authority's restrictions. 85 
79. Id. (first alteration in original). 
80. Id. at 107-08, 458 S.E.2d at 296. 
81. Id. at 108, 458 S.E.2d at 296. 
82. 251 Va. 201, 468 S.E.2d 90 (1996). 
83. 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946). 
84. Rich17UJnd, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 251 Va. at 213, 468 S.E.2d at 97 
(quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 266). 
85. Id. at 214, 468 S.E.2d at 97. 
1538 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1525 
I. Landlord and Tenant 
The supreme court declared in Johnson v. Marcel86 that a 
landlord committed a common. law trespass when he changed 
the locks, removed the telephone wall socket, and blocked his 
tenants' driveway.87 The supreme court stated that the land-
lord had no right to enter the premises without the plaintiffs' 
consent, as the tenants had the right to possession. 88 
J. Restrictive Covenants (Group Homes) 
In Trible v. Bland, 89 the Supreme Court of Virginia held 
that Virginia Code section 15.1-486.390 is not a cap on the 
number of people who could live in such a dwelling. 91 A more 
expansive definition of a group home is permitted by locali-
ties.92 In this action, the Town of West Point had issued a cer-
tificate of occupancy for no more than twenty-one residents. The 
supreme court stated that occupancy was not limited by the 
zoning enabling act to authorize homes of only eight persons in 
a group home.93 A dissent by the Chief Justice stated that the 
majority's holding violated the statute by allowing group homes 
of more than eight disabled persons in a residential district.94 
Although, as a matter of principle, statutes are generally 
presumed to be prospective in application, the supreme court in 
Sussex Community Services Ass'n v. Virginia Society for Mental-
ly Retarded Children, Inc. 95 held that Virginia Code section 36-
86. 251 Va. 58, 465 S.E.2d 815 (1996). 
87. Id. at 60, 465 S.E.2d at 817. 
88. Id. 
89. 250 Va. 20, 458 S.E.2d 297 (1995). 
90. Virginia Code § 15.1-486.3 provides in pertinent part that a residential facility 
in which no more than eight mentally ill, mentally retarded or developmentally dis-
abled persons reside for the purposes of local zoning ordinances shall be considered 
residential occupancy by a single family. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486.3 (Cum. Supp. 
1996). 
91. Trible, 250 Va. at 24, 458 S.E.2d at 299. 
92. Id. at 24-25, 458 S.E.2d at 299. 
93. Id. at 24, 458 S.E.2d at 299. 
94. Id. at 26, 458 S.E.2d at 300. 
95. 251 Va. 240, 467 S.E.2d 468 (1996). 
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96.6 applies retroactively.96 The supreme court applied the cur-
rent version of section 36-96.6(C), as amended in 1991, to cove-
nants recorded in 1975. 
K Real Estate Contracts 
In High Knob Associates v. Douglas,97 the supreme court 
held the Virginia Subdivided Land Sales Act of 1978 
("SLSA"),98 which would have required the transfer of common 
areas to lot owners' association when seventy-five percent of the 
subdivision lots were sold, did not apply to the subdivision in 
question.99 The contracts for the sale of the lots of the subdivi-
sion were not within the definition of a land sales installment 
contract pursuant to the SLSA. 100 In this instance, title was 
transferred to purchasers before the completed performance of 
payments under the contracts. In the classic definition of an 
installment contract, the vendor retains title until payment is 
completed under a series of installments for the purchase of the 
property. 
The supreme court also addressed several other issues. First, 
the supreme court held the Housing and Urban Development 
Statements ("HUD Reports"), given to prospective purchasers 
pursuant to the (Federal) Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure 
Act, 101 were incorporated into the contracts of the 
purchasers.102 The HUD Reports provided for the transfer of 
the common areas upon the sale of seventy-five percent of the 
subdivision lots. Therefore, a vendor's amendment to the bylaws 
changing the required transfer of common areas upon seventy-
five to ninety percent of lots sold was ineffective.103 Second, 
the supreme court held that the landowners' contractual claims 
were not barred by the five-year statute of limitations since the 
time of performance under the contract did not occur until 
96. Id. at 244, 467 S.E.2d at 469. 
97. 249 Va. 478, 457 S.E.2d 349 (1995). 
98. VA. CODE .ANN. §§ 55-337 to -351 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996). 
99. High Knob, 249 Va. at 483, 457 S.E.2d at 352. 
100. Id. at 484, 457 S.E.2d at 352. 
101. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1701-1720 (1994). 
102. High Knob, 249 Va. at 486, 457 S.E.2d at 354. 
103. Id. at 487-89, 457 S.E.2d at 354-55. 
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seventy-five percent of the lots were sold.104 The statute can-
not begin to run until the time of performance has passed.105 
Third, the supreme court held that the HUD Report statement 
that the common areas were to be transferred to the owners' 
associations free and clear of encumbrances constituted a con-
tractual obligation of the vendor/developer.106 Fourth, since the 
transfer of the common areas was not yet required, there was 
no adverse impact on the present lienholder, and the trial court 
correctly determined the lienholder was not a necessary party 
to this suit.107 Finally, the calculation of the seventy-five per-
cent threshold of transfer should be based upon the initial 
transfer of lots, and lots subsequently re-purchased by the ven-
dor should not be used in the calculation. 108 
In Price v. Taylor, 109 Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the 
trial court's finding that mutual promises are adequate to con-
stitute consideration for a contract for the sale of land.110 
However, the supreme court reversed the trial court on the 
issues of: (1) whether the evidence produced by the vendor was 
sufficient to support jury instructions on the issue that the 
contract was obtained by fraud; and (2) whether admitting the 
testimony of three attorneys as witnesses was error. m The 
supreme court stated that admission of the testimony of the 
attorneys was improper because their statements were conclu-
sions of law in violation of Virginia Code section 8.01-401.3.112 
L. Suretyship 
In Courson v. Simpson, 113 the Supreme Court of Virginia, in 
a case of first impression, rejected the decision by the majority 
in Colonial American National Bank v. Kosnoski, 114 where the 
104. Id. at 486-87, 457 S.E.2d at 354. 
105. Id., 457 S.E.2d at 353-54. 
106. Id. at 489, 457 S.E.2d at 355. 
107. Id. at 489-90, 457 S.E.2d at 355-56. 
108. Id. at 490-91, 457 S.E.2d at 356. 
109. 251 Va. 82, 466 S.E.2d 87 (1996). 
110. Id. at 84, 466 S.E.2d at 88. 
111. Id. at 85-86, 466 S.E.2d at 88-89. 
112. Id. at 86, 466 S.E.2d at 89. 
113. 251 Va. 315, 468 S.E.2d 17 (1996). 
114. 617 F.2d 1025 (4th Cir. 1980). 
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Fourth Circuit held that a creditor, upon receiving notice under 
Virginia Code section 49-26, must sue all solvent, resident debt-
ors and sureties.115 The majority in Courson set forth the rule 
that a creditor need only sue solvent resident principal debt-
ors.116 The supreme court opined that the term "every party" 
in section 49-26 means only debtors.117 Furthermore, the ma-
jority deemed that the debtor was insolvent, which rendered 
suit unnecessary.118 
A three-justice dissent disagreed, based upon the fact that 
the surety had assigned sums sufficient to cover the debt which 
were also secured by a deed of trust on the surety's home.119 
In addition, the dissent reasoned that "every party" in section 
49-26 includes sureties. Thus, the surety should be discharged 
due to the creditor's failure to sue either the principal debtor or 
the surety, as is required under the statute after notice is given 
by the surety.120 
In Janus v. Sproul, 121 the Supreme Court of Virginia held 
that a letter written to the creditor, on the debtor's corporate 
letterhead, was an insufficient memorandum under the Statute 
of Frauds to make the president of the corporation liable as a 
surety.122 Under the Statute of Frauds,. promises to pay the 
debt of another must be expressed in writing.123 Here, the 
president's oral personal promise was not clearly indicated, as 
the letter merely acknowledged that a commission owed by the 
corporation would be paid.124 
115. Courson, 251 Va. at 321, 468 S.E.2d at 21. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 323, 468 S.E.2d at 22. 
120. Id. 
121. 250 Va. 90, 458 S.E.2d 300 (1995). 
122. Id. at 91-92, 458 S.E.2d at 301. 
123. Id. at 91, 458 S.E.2d at 301. 
124. Id. at 92, 458 S.E.2d at 301. 
